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ARTICLE
The Legitimacy of Dam Development in
International Watercourses: A Case Study
of the Harirud River Basin
Mohsen Nagheeby,* Mehdi Piri D.** and Michael Faure***
Abstract
This article examines the international legitimacy of unilateral dam development in an inter-
national watercourse from the perspective of international water law. Drawing upon technical
analysis over the Harirud River Basin, the article discusses probable negative impacts of uni-
lateral dam development in Afghanistan on downstream Iran and Turkmenistan. Competing
claims are analyzed to assess emerging transboundary damage under customary international
water law. Applying these insights to the case study, this article explores how legal norms and
principles can contribute to transboundary water cooperation. It investigates how equitable
and reasonable utilization, as required by the United Nations Watercourse Convention,
could be reached and whether current activities are in conformity with international norms.
Based on this analysis and in the light of international customary law, the article questions
the compatibility of unilateral control and capture of water resources in Afghanistan, particu-
larly through the Salma Dam, with ‘equitable and reasonable utilization’ and ‘no signiﬁcant
harm’ rules. The article also argues that building the Salma Dam results in signiﬁcant trans-
boundary harm to downstream states. Hence, such harm could be considered as signiﬁcant
transboundary damage. Conclusions point to an understanding of water law as a form of
institutional guidance in order to provide a transparent setting for transboundary water
cooperation among riparian states.
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1. 
One of the key challenges for the 21st century is the sharing of international water
resources. The global community is concerned mostly by the lack of a holistic coopera-
tive legal framework for most of the world’s 263 transboundary river basins.1 An
important aspect of this challenge regards the scope for how international law resolves
conﬂicts and provides a sustainable solution related to transboundary rivers.2 Building
on the rich literature on international water law, this article analyzes the legitimacy of
dam building in relation to the law of international watercourses.3 The contribution of
international water law is investigated by examining the speciﬁc case of the Harirud/
Tejen River Basin (hereafter referred to as the Harirud Basin), which is an international
water basin shared between Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkmenistan.
Water resources have crucially contributed to the livelihood of the people in the
Harirud Basin.4 A growing population, economic development, the impacts of climate
change, along with poor water governance, have placed enormous pressure on the
water resources of the Harirud River.5 This article will therefore argue that all riparian
states (upstream Afghanistan, downstream Iran and Turkmenistan) have focused
mainly on dam development to harness the water to relieve this pressure without
respecting the water rights in the basin.6 In 2016, Afghanistan, as the upstream late-
developing country, ofﬁcially opened the Salma Dam on the upper reaches of the
Harirud River.7 It is said that this dam will cut down the water ﬂow of the river to
Iran and Turkmenistan by 73%.8 However, in 2004, Iran and Turkmenistan had
already constructed a common dam, the Doosti Dam (doosti meaning ‘friendship’ in
1 A.T. Wolf, Atlas of International Freshwater Agreements, Vol. 4 (UNEP/Earthprint, 2002).
2 However, ‘because water is an inter-disciplinary resource, international legal norms cannot by them-
selves provide resolution to disputes over international watercourses. Equally important is the fact
that there can be no resolution of water disputes without international legal norms on international
watercourses’: S.M.A. Salman & L. Boisson de Chazournes, International Watercourses: Enhancing
Cooperation and Managing Conﬂict: Proceedings of a World Bank Seminar (World Bank, 1998),
p. 119.
3 Yihdego and Rieu-Clarke explore legitimacy and distributive justice within the context of fairness over
international watercourses: Z. Yihdego & A. Rieu-Clarke, ‘An Exploration of Fairness in International
Law through the Blue Nile and GERD’ (2016) 41(4)Water International, pp. 528–49. Borrowing from
Thomas Franck (1995), they describe legitimacy as ‘procedural fairness’ and associate distributive justice
with substantive principles of international water law: see, e.g., T.M. Franck, Fairness in International
Law and Institutions (Clarendon Press, 1995).
4 See, e.g., United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), ‘Second Assessment of
Transboundary Rivers, Lakes and Groundwaters’, Aug. 2011, available at: https://www.unece.org/
env/water/second_assessment.html.
5 Ibid., pp. 129–30.
6 See, e.g., EastWest Institute, ‘Enhancing Security in Afghanistan and Central Asia through Regional
Cooperation on Water’, Amu Darya Basin Consultation Report, 1 May 2011, available at:
https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/enhancing-security-afghanistan-and-central-asia-through-regional-cooperation-
water.
7 See, e.g., ‘Modi and Ghani Opened the Salma Dam’, BBC Farsi, 4 June 2016, available at:
http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2016/06/160604_k05_slama_dam_ (in Farsi).
8 For general discourses on the impacts arising from the Salma Dam and concerns of downstream coun-
tries, see S. Peterson, ‘Why aDam in AfghanistanMight Set Back Peace’,The Christian ScienceMonitor,
30 July 2013, available at: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2013/0730/Why-a-
dam-in-Afghanistan-might-set-back-peace.
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the Persian language). These unilateral and bilateral dam constructions on the Harirud
Basin, without any trilateral cooperation between Afghanistan, Iran and
Turkmenistan, may well become a source of disputes in the region.
Afghanistan is one of the most geopolitically important areas in the world.9 The
‘great game’10 between the world’s superpowers has created the current structure of
Afghanistan with its related international law problems. The regional countries have
become embroiled in competition over ‘inﬂuence, power, hegemony and proﬁts’11
and competition between India and Pakistan is rampant in Afghanistan.12
Continuing the political approach of superpowers, these states have been playing out
their rivalries in Afghanistan either by ﬁnancial investment or through political inter-
ference.13 In 2002, India promised USD 750 million in aid and Pakistan promised
USD 150 million.14 In particular, the Salma Dam, the case studied in this contribution,
is funded by a USD 200 million-plus grant from the Indian government.15 It has been
argued that by planning to construct 62 dams in Afghanistan, India is furthering its
own hegemonic ambitions against Pakistan.16 The Asian Development Bank (ADB)
and the World Bank, along with other international institutions, are also involved,
technically or ﬁnancially, in development plans for the basin inside Afghanistan.17 It
is therefore interesting to consider how legal rules have played out in this ﬁrst case
study of unilateral dam development, and to investigate how the concept of ‘equitable
and reasonable utilization’ has been implemented in a politically charged environment.
It is also interesting to mention that many international organizations have taken up
9 For a discussion of Afghanistan and surrounding politics, see P. Hopkirk,TheGreat Game: The Struggle
for Empire in Central Asia (Kodansha Globe, 1992). For more information see also D.L. Smith, ‘Central
Asia: A New Great Game?’ (1996) 23(3) Asian Affairs: An American Review, pp. 147–75; see also
S. Tanner & R. Todd, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the
Taliban (Blackstone Audio Incorporated, 2012). For an extensive discussion on ‘the new great game’,
see L. Kleveman, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia (Grove Press, 2004).
10 The ‘great game’ is a term which referred originally to the strategic and rivalry conﬂicts between the
Russian and British Empires in the 19th century to control the geopolitical land of Afghanistan in
Central Asia.
11 For general discussion of how and why regional states engage in Afghanistan, see, e.g., Economist Staff,
‘The Great Game Revisited: India and Pakistan Are Playing out Their Rivalries in Afghanistan’,
The Economist, 22 Mar. 2007, available at: http://www.economist.com/node/8896853. For an exten-
sive discussion of Afghanistan’s dam development and geopolitical characteristics, see M. Nagheeby
& J. Warner, ‘The Geopolitical Overlay of the Hydropolitics of the Harirud River Basin’ (2018)
18(6) International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, pp. 839–60.
12 H.V. Pant, ‘India in Afghanistan: A Test Case for a Rising Power’ (2010) 18(2) Contemporary South
Asia, pp. 133–53.
13 Ibid., pp. 148–50.
14 Pant, n. 12 above.
15 See, e.g., ‘Salma Dam to be Completed in 9 Months: Afghan Ministry of Energy and Water’,Wadsam
News, 7 Sept. 2013, available at: http://www.wadsam.com/salma-dam-to-be-completed-in-9-months-
afghan-ministry-of-energy-and-water-232.
16 See, e.g., Economist Staff, n. 11 above.
17 See Asian Development Bank (ADB), ‘Western Basins Water Resources Management and Irrigated
Agriculture Development Project’, Technical Assistance Reports, Oct. 2004, p. 3. For more information,
see also M.A. Clemens & M. Kremer, ‘The New Role for the World Bank’ (2016) 30(1) Journal of
Economic Perspectives, pp. 53–76, at 60; and WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank Group and the
UN Population Division, ‘Trends in Maternal Mortality: 1990–2015’, Nov. 2015, available at:
https://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/monitoring/maternal-mortality-2015/en.
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commitments in the region. This leads to the question of the responsibility of those
international organizations in that:
while ADB and its co-ﬁnancing partners are not directly involved in developing the Salma
Dam, the association and possible interdependence of activities within the ADB Project
and development of the dam pose reputational risks to ADB and its co-ﬁnancing partners
if the dam is not developed in accordance with the best international practices and ADB
safeguard policies.18
This contribution will argue that the dam development in the Harirud Basin challenges
the principles of ‘equitable and reasonable utilization’ along with the ‘no-harm obliga-
tion’, themain concepts indicated in Articles 5 and 7 of the 1997UNConvention on the
Law of the Non‐navigational Uses of InternationalWatercourses (referred to also as the
UN Watercourses Convention (UNWC)).19 The riparian states of the Harirud River all
claim to respect the applicable international conventions as well as customary inter-
national water law. This therefore raises the question of how to qualify the unilateral
development of the dam under customary international law. The challenge is especially
interesting since the dam in question was constructed by Afghanistan, which has the low-
est development index of the three riparian states. Afghanistan therefore claims that it
needs the dam in order to raise its development level, which raises the question of whether
this argument can justify jeopardizing the interests of the downstream states. It is therefore
permissible to raise a question of legitimacy in the manner in which it is here discussed.
A large dam changes the ﬂow of a river. Hence, the construction of a dam in a trans-
boundary river by an upstream state often leads to conﬂicts with downstream states.
The case of the Salma Dam is particularly interesting, given that it is constructed in a
region of high tension and has been promoted as a tool to foster economic development
in Afghanistan and help to lift the population out of poverty. This article will make use
of an earlier study which analyzed the impacts of the development of the dam and the
speciﬁc hydrological consequences for the basin.20 The case study in this article may
also be used as an analytical example for similar dams like the Turkish Ilisu Dam on
the Tigris and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile River.
The study considers primarily the role of Iran and Afghanistan and does not pay spe-
ciﬁc attention to the situation of Turkmenistan. To an important extent Turkmenistan
has the same status as Iran as a downstream user of the river. Unfortunately, data for the
situation of Turkmenistan is not available and the transboundary water interactions
18 ADB, ibid.
19 New York, NY (United States (US)), 21 May 1997, in force 17 Aug. 2014, available at:
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf. This article discusses
the UNWC but not the UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
Watercourses and International Lakes (Helsinki (Finland), 17Mar. 1992, in force 6 Oct. 1996, avail-
able at: https://www.unece.org/ﬁleadmin/DAM/env/water/pdf/watercon.pdf) because, although nei-
ther convention is binding upon the riparian states of the Harirud River, the former to a large extent
reﬂects customary international water law (see n. 78 below).
20 M. Nagheeby, Analysis of the Hydro-political Impacts of Dam Development in Transboundary River
Basins: A Case Study of the Harirud River Basin (MSc dissertation, UNESCO-IHE, 2014), available
at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328791212_Analysis_of_the_Hydro-Political_Impacts_
of_Dam_Development_in_Transboundary_River_Basins_A_Case_Study_of_the_Harirud_River_Basin.
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between Iran and Afghanistan are more visible. The article ﬁrst provides some back-
ground facts concerning the Harirud River in Section 2. Section 3 analyzes the legitim-
acy of the construction of a dam in a shared watercourse under international law. The
possible negative consequences of the dam’s construction are outlined in Section
4. Section 5 then examines the negative consequences of the construction in the light
of the principles of international water law, before Section 6 concludes.
2.      
2.1. Geographical and Socio-economic Background
The 1,124 kilometres (km) long Harirud River originates in the high mountains of
Afghanistan over 3,000 metres above sea level. The Harirud River, which has a total
drainage area of approximately 112,000 km2, ﬂows from the Koh-i-Baba Mountains
(250 km west of Kabul) to the west. Around 70 km east of Herat, the Kabgan
(Kawgan) River, the major tributary of the Harirud River in Afghanistan which
ﬂows almost parallel to it, also joins the Harirud River. Then, continuing to the west
through the city of Herat, it turns northwards to reach the Iranian part and forms
approximately 160 km of the political border between Afghanistan and Iran. Later,
by joining the Kashafrud River, it shapes around 170 km of the political border
between Iran and Turkmenistan (this part of the river which forms the political border
between Iran and Turkmenistan is ofﬁcially known as the Tejen River), and ﬁnally it
irrigates the Karakum desert in Turkmenistan and ends in the desert.21 Figure 1
schematically shows the geographical situation of the Harirud Basin, including the
approximate location of the dams, main gauge stations and cities. Precipitation,
which includes snow and rain, occurs mainly in the winter and spring.22 The mean
annual precipitation is estimated at 236 millimetres (mm) in the Afghan part with
uneven spatial distribution. From March to June, high ﬂoods are observed in the
Harirud River while from August to February there is a very low ﬂow.23
The Harirud River is extremely important for Afghanistan, Iran and Turkmenistan
from a socio-economic point of view. The economy of the basin and the income of a
large portion of the population are highly dependent on the water resources of the
river. About 50% of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the basin is linked directly
to the agricultural sector (particularly in Afghanistan). The Harirud River contributes
greatly to guaranteeing the security of food and drinking water, particularly in Herat
21 See, e.g., K. Frenken (ed.), ‘Irrigation in Central Asia in Figures: AQUASTAT Survey-2012’, Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Water Reports, No. 39, available at:
http://www.fao.org/3/i3289e/i3289e.pdf.
22 K.J. Virgo, M.H. Aslami & B. Ahmed, ‘Participatory Watershed Management: Examples from Herat,
Western Afghanistan’, Proceedings of the World Association of Soil and Water Conservation, Paper
No. P1, 30 Nov. 2006, pp. 65–81, at 67–8, available at: https://taa.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/
10/ Paper2%20Virgo_Afghanistan_paper_11_24_06_ﬁnal1.pdf.
23 S.K. Adhikary et al., ‘Simulating Impacts of EFR Consideration on Reservoir Operation Policy and
Irrigation Management in the Hari Rod River Basin, Afghanistan’, 19th International Congress on
Modelling and Simulation (MODSIM2011), Perth, WA (Australia), 12–16 Dec. 2011, available at:
https://www.mssanz.org.au/modsim2011/I12/adhikary.pdf.
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and Mashhad. It contributes to supplying over 50% of the total domestic water
demand of Mashhad, a large holy city in Iran which is visited by over 20 million pil-
grims and tourists per year.24 The population of Afghanistan is also hugely dependent
on this shared water resource. Herat, one of Afghanistan’s major cities with an antici-
pated prosperous economic future, has great potential to develop rapidly, although it
has seen insecurity caused by drought, war and internal conﬂicts. As a result of the
long, devastating war in Afghanistan, the country has been labelled a least developed
country, and the situation has forced many people to emigrate to other countries,
mostly Iran.25 Therefore, water resources like the Harirud River play a strategic role
in bringing security and income to the Afghan people. Table 1 shows the population
of each riparian state living in the basin and the growth rate.
In the Harirud Basin, irrigation networks are currently distributed along the river,
mostly in the lower basin from Herat in Afghanistan to Serakhs in Iran and
Turkmenistan. Most of the irrigation systems in Herat which are still active today are
traditional. The efﬁciency of the irrigation networks is about 25 to 30%. Table 2
shows the irrigable land areas of the Harirud Basin in every riparian state.26
Figure 1 GeographicalMap of theHarirud Basin (showing the damswith more than 50million cubic
metres (MCM) capacity)
24 UNECE, n. 4 above, p. 129.
25 See, e.g., UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘UNHCR Country Operations Proﬁle:
Islamic Republic of Iran’ (2013) UNHCR Reports, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/539809fb0.pdf.
26 For more information about the geography and hydrology of the Harirud River Basin, see R. Favre &
G.M. Kamal, Watershed ATLAS of Afghanistan (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU),
2004).
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2.2. Customary Distribution of the Harirud River Basin Flows
Over 90%of the total ﬂow in theHarirud River is supplied by annual snowfall and rain
in the winter and spring in Afghanistan.27 This makes Afghanistan the main water con-
tributor to the total water ﬂows of the Harirud River, although there are some minor
tributaries in Iranian territory.
According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), from 84,000
MCM of the volume of total annual surface waters in Afghanistan, the Harirud
Basin has the potential for 1,600 MCM.28 The FAO points out that on average
1,070 MCM per year of surface waters in the Harirud River reach the Iranian border.
This data is based on the situation as it was before the construction of the Salma Dam
and thus does not take into account its impact.29
Generally, the groundwater is saline or brackish in the lower part of the Harirud
Basin, such as in Herat and Serakhs. According to 1980s statistics, from total irrigated
lands in Afghanistan, only 15.4% is supplied by aquifers through springs and deep/
shallow wells. The earlier data from the 1960s illustrates that almost 98% of the












Afghanistan 39,300 39.5 1,290,000 32 2.03
Iran 49,264 43.7 3,410,000 69 1.25
Turkmenistan 23,640 20.9 168,000 7 1.14
Total 112,204 100 4,868,000 43 —
Source
M. King & B. Sturtewagen, Making the Most of Afghanistan’s River Basins: Opportunities for Regional
Co-operation (EastWest Institute, 2010), p. 6.
Table 2 Irrigable Land Areas in the Harirud Basin
Country Area in the country (ha) Irrigated land areas (ha) Orchards and market garden (ha)
Afghanistan 3,930,000 133,084 927
Iran 4,926,400 292,920 14,113
Turkmenistan 2,364,000 N/A N/A
Source
R. Favre & G.M. Kamal, Watershed ATLAS of Afghanistan (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit,
2004), pp. 125–9. See also Nagheeby, n. 20.
27 Favre & Kamal, ibid., p. 82.
28 Frenken, n. 21 above.
29 Nagheeby, n. 20 above.
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irrigated area in Herat Province was irrigated by the surface water of rivers and not by
groundwater.30
2.3. Control and Use of the Harirud River Flows
Iran and Turkmenistan, without the involvement of Afghanistan, jointly funded the
construction of the Doosti Dam, situated in the downstream zone. This work was
based on an agreement between Iran and Turkmenistan signed in 1999.31 The
Doosti Dam, with a reservoir volume of 1,250 MCM, was completed in 2004.
According to the agreement, the water resources in the reservoir are shared equally
between both countries. Iran uses the water of the Doosti Dam ﬁrstly for drinking pur-
poses, secondly for agriculture, and then to meet industrial demand. In addition to the
182 km-long pipeline to transfer water to the city of Mashhad in 2009,32 Iran has also
built several dams on the tributary river (Kashafrud River), which is located at the end
of the basin.
In the upstream area of the Harirud River, with technical and ﬁnancial support from
the Indian government, Afghanistan has built the Salma Dam with a capacity of 633
MCM. This dam opened in 2016.33 Also ﬁnancially and technically supported by
the ADB, the Salma Dam will increase the irrigable lands from 35,000 to 80,000
hectares (ha) and produce 42 megawatts (MW) of electricity.34 In addition, Afghanistan
has plans to build the Kabgan Dam with a reservoir capacity of almost 150 MCM on
the Kabgan tributary river, and the Pishdan Dam with 50 MCM reservoir capacity on
the Karukh tributary river.35 Reportedly, waters behind these two latest dams will be
transferred to the outside of the basin by Afghanistan for the exploitation of mines.36
2.4. Ecological Importance
The Harirud River ends in the desert of Karakum. According to Adhikary and
co-authors, the Harirud Basin has an unstable ecological environment.37 The region
located between the Tejan River and the Murghab River, which originates from the
north of Afghanistan and ﬂows to the south of Turkmenistan, is known as Badghyz.
Located between the mountains and the sand desert of Karakum, the fauna and ﬂora
of Badghyz accordingly reﬂect the mixed bio-geographic connections. Covered by a
30 S. Chokkakula, Interrogating Irrigation Inequities, Canal Irrigation Systems in Injil District, Herat
(AREU, 2009). See also Favre & Kamal, n. 26 above.
31 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Construction and Operation of the Doosti Dam, Ashghabad
(Turkmenistan), 20 Oct. 1999, between the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and
Turkmenistan, available at: http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/93319 (in Farsi).
32 See, e.g., S. Nairizi, ‘IntegratedWater ResourcesManagement (IWRM) in the Critical Arid Basin of Iran
(Mashhad Basin)’, Power Point presentation (n.d.).
33 See n. 7 above.
34 Nathan Associates Inc. & Louis Berger International Inc., ‘Afghanistan Water Constraints Overview
Analysis: Final Report’, Report No. PB-93-180511/XAB, May 1992.
35 ADB, n. 17 above.
36 Nathan Associates Inc. & Louis Berger International Inc., n. 34 above; see also Nagheeby, n. 20.
37 See Adhikary et al., n. 23 above.
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unique xeric savanna ecosystem, Badghyz is dominated by wild pistachio trees, which
are recognized by many as similar to the African savanna. Many species in Badghyz are
included in the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources (IUCN) or Turkmenistan Red Data Lists. Additionally, the Tejan valley,
located near Serakhs in Iran and Turkmenistan, is recognized by BirdLife
International as an Important Bird Area (IBA) as a result of the long-term viability of
bird populations.38
2.5. The Political Context and Existing Legal Institutions
‘Avoiding Water Wars: Water Scarcity and Central Asia’s Growing Importance for
Stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, a 2011 report by the United States (US)
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, warned of the growing disputes over transbound-
ary waters between Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries.39 Similarly, acknow-
ledging the importance of understanding the reasons behind these sentiments,40 the
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) noted in 2008 that developing
water infrastructure in Afghanistan over transboundarywaters was an important driver
of disputes and insecurity in the region. NUPI revealed that the geopolitical rivalries
among China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia and the US, along with competition over
water resources in Central Asia, are creating serious problems. Consequently, the pol-
itical context of transboundary rivers is becoming more complex in the region.41
The ﬁrst formal agreement regarding the allocation of water resources on the
Harirud River is that between Iran and Russia, dating back to 26 February 1921,
after Afghanistan had declared its independence in 1919. The third section of the agree-
ment states that ‘[t]he two states shall equally exploit the Atrak river and other border
rivers and waters’. This was followed by the signing of an agreement on 20 February
1926 between Iran and Russia entitled ‘Exploitation of Border Rivers and Waters
along the Harirud River to the Caspian Sea’.42 Its ﬁrst Article states that ‘[t]he entire
water of the Harirud River (Tejan River) … shall be divided between the two states
in ten equal parts of which three parts shall belong to Iran and seven parts shall belong
38 V. Fet, ‘Central Asia: Northern Afghanistan, Southern Turkmenistan, Southern Uzbekistan, Extending
into Iran and Tajikistan’, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 2014, available at: http://worldwildlife.
org/ecoregions/pa1306.
39 See, e.g., ‘Avoiding Water Wars: Water Scarcity and Central Asia’s Growing Importance for Stability in
Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Majority Staff Report, 22 Feb. 2011, available at: https://www.foreign.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Senate%20Print%20112-10%20Avoiding%20Water%20Wars%20Water%20
Scarcity%20and%20Central%20Asia%20Afgahnistan%20and%20Pakistan.pdf. See also R.G. Palau,
‘Afghanistan’s Transboundary Water Resources: Regional Dimensions’, Civil-Military Fusion Centre,
July 2011.
40 A.E. Cascão et al., ‘Why Are Water Wars Back on the Agenda? And Why We Think It’s a Bad Idea!’,
FLOWs, 22 Mar. 2018, available at: https://ﬂows.hypotheses.org/1126.
41 See, e.g., Heidi Kjærnet & Stina Torjesen, Afghanistan and Regional Instability: A Risk Assessment
(Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2011). For an extensive discussion, see Nagheeby &
Warner, n. 11 above.
42 See Agreement on the Regimes of Border Rivers, 26 Feb. 1921, between the Imperial Government of Iran
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Agreement on the Regimes of Border Rivers, 20 Feb.
1926, between the Imperial Government of Iran and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
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to the Soviet Union’. In addition to the water allocation provisions, both states agreed
on the construction of a dam on the Harirud River with equal water allocation. In
March 1958, the construction of a common dam was the subject of negotiations
between Iran and Russia, which resulted in a number of pilot studies of the dam
being undertaken.
Eventually, in 1974 Iran and Russia began speciﬁc negotiations, subject to the 1926
and 1958 agreements, to construct a common dam downstream. However, in 1976 it
was revealed that Afghanistan had been trying to build the Salma Dam on the upstream
river.43 This Afghan project involved Indian and British experts, as well as the World
Bank. Cognizant of Afghanistan’s decision to build a dam in the upper reaches of
the river, Iran and the Soviet Union, in 1975, emphasized the necessity for trilateral
cooperation among the three riparian states. However, Afghanistan did not respond
to this political signal. The unilateral efforts to construct a dam by the riparian states
of the Harirud River were stopped by the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in
1979 and Iraq’s invasion of Iran in 1980.44
Negotiations between Iran and the Soviet Union on the construction of a common
dam on the downstream Harirud River, based on the 1926 agreement, resumed in
1992 between Iran and the newly formed republic of Turkmenistan, established after
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Iran and Turkmenistan agreed in 1999 to share the
water resources of the Doosti Dam reservoir equally.45 Further to the 1999 agreement,
the two countries started the construction of the Doosti Dam in 2000, and ofﬁcially
opened the dam in 2004. Consequently, according to the EastWest Institute – an inter-
national think tank –Afghanistan complained to Iran and Turkmenistan that it had not
been consulted over the construction of the dam.46 Afghanistan’s concern about the
Doosti Dam, as we argue, might be justiﬁed under the concept of ‘historical water
rights’ or ‘existing water rights’, which are likely to be claimed by Iran and
Turkmenistan in the future – perhaps giving them the upper hand in negotiations –
in the context of international water law.47 Furthermore, according to Salman, the
building of such a dam by the downstream states may adversely affect future uses of
the waters of the shared watercourse by the upstream state.48 On the other hand,
although the construction of the Salma Dam had been planned since 1976 by
Afghanistan with Indian and British support, the country could not make physical pro-
gress on its construction because of the conﬂict and civil wars in the country. After
43 See Nagheeby & Warner, n. 11.
44 For more detailed analysis, see Nagheeby & Warner, n. 11 above.
45 See Agreement on the Construction and Operation of the Doosti Dam, 20 Oct. 1999, between the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Government of Turkmenistan Republics, Art. 9,
available at: http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/93319.
46 See EastWest Institute, n. 6 above.
47 Certain legal doctrines in the context of water law, and particularly under the law of prior appropriation,
posit that the ﬁrst person to obtain thewater for his own beneﬁcial use has priority over water allocation:
see, e.g., A.D. Tarlock, ‘Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric’ (2000) 76(4) North Dakota
Law Review, pp. 881–910, at 881.
48 M.A. Salman, ‘DownstreamRiparians CanAlsoHarmUpstreamRiparians: TheConcept of Foreclosure
of Future Uses’ (2010) 35(4) Water International, pp. 350–64.
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11 September 2001 and the start of President Karzai’s time in ofﬁce, the USD
200 million Salma Dam project, a budget which ultimately rose to USD 300 million,
was initiated by the Indian government.49
In addition to the Salma Dam, Afghanistan is developing several new irrigation
schemes along the Harirud River with the support from the ADB under the Western
Basins Water Resource Management and Irrigated Agriculture Development
Project.50 It is argued that Afghanistan sought to complete hydraulic projects such as
the Salma Dam on the Harirud Basin in the face of previously constructed infrastruc-
ture by downstream countries to improve its bargaining position in likely future
negotiations.51
Meanwhile, recalling the overtures of Iran andRussia towards negotiations in 1975–
76, which had been rebuffed by Afghanistan, in 2006 and again in 2010 Iran and
Turkmenistan jointly sent an ofﬁcial letter to President Karzai with an invitation for tri-
lateral cooperation on the Harirud River. These invitations alsowent unanswered.52 As
Mahmoud Saikal, a former Afghan diplomat, mentioned on Afghan television: ‘We
[Afghans] received a letter from Iran and Turkmenistan in 2006, asking for cooperation
on the Harirud River, but we [Afghans] responded to them that we do not want to talk
about our waters’.53 More recently, Fazl Ahmad Zakeri, the Ministry of Energy and
Water’s Former Acting Director for the Harirud and Murghab River Basin in Heart,
answered ‘Yes, the Iranians are asking for negotiations. They are always asking for
negotiations [because they will get] much less water’.54 Afghanistan’s unwillingness
to cooperate on transboundary waters in the region is also clearly documented in the
words of Afghan ofﬁcial Shujaudin Ziaye:55 ‘Maybe they [Iran and Turkmenistan]
need to talk with us, but we don’t see any need to talk with them, to negotiate about
water. Right now, no’.56
This message that there is ‘no need for negotiation concerning the Harirud River’
from the Afghan side continued until recently and created concerns for downstream
users. As a result, Iranian President Rohani raised the concern that ‘Iran could not
be silent about the environment of the region and negative impacts arising from dam
development in Afghanistan’.57
A round of negotiations took place in June and October 2017 between Iran and
Afghanistan (but not Turkmenistan) in Tehran (Iran) and Kabul (Afghanistan)
49 See Pant, n. 12 above.
50 See ADB, n. 17 above.
51 See V. Thomas & J. Warner, ‘Hydro-politics in the Harirud/Tejen River Basin: Afghanistan as Hydro-
hegemon?’ (2015) 40(4)Water International, pp. 593–613. See also Nagheeby &Warner, n. 11 above.




54 Peterson, n. 8 above.
55 The former deputy Minister of Energy and Water in Kabul.
56 Peterson, n. 8 above.
57
‘Rohani’s Criticism of Irregular Dam Building by Neighbouring Countries’, Hamshahri Online News,
4 July 2017, available at: http://www.hamshahrionline.ir/details/375052 (in Farsi).
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respectively regarding a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ on various issues,
mostly related to security and water.58 Simultaneously, local media revealed related
negotiations between Afghanistan and Turkmenistan.59 However, the media has not
yet reported any meaningful progress to indicate Afghanistan’s genuine interest in
negotiating matters regarding the Harirud waters with Iranian and Turkmen ofﬁcials.
Thus, a question mark remains over the legal regime concerning the utilization/alloca-
tion of the Harirud waters and the legitimacy of dam buildings therein.
3.     
  
3.1. Assessing Legitimacy
In this section we assess not just the legality but the legitimacy of the construction of the
dam in the international watercourse. Perhaps it is necessary ﬁrst to describe what is
legal and what is legitimate. Generally, legality requires compliance with the applicable
law and rules. Legitimacy, however, involves the implication of correct, fair and justi-
ﬁed actions. Legitimacy is characterized by what is achieved with justice and what is
deserved. Therefore, in this section, we ﬁrst elaborate on the international rules applic-
able to the construction of a dam on a transboundary river. Further, in a broader
analysis, we will address other issues involved which could be used to justify unilateral
dam development. International water law as treaty law is limited to the 1997 UNWC
and the 1992 UNECEWC,60 but these conventions fail to provide more than a frame-
work for further cooperation. In this article, international water law is considered as
customary rules and principles to guide water conﬂict resolution. Thus, here, the
1997 UNWC, considered to be customary law, is used as the basis for the legal frame-
work, and we examine the transboundary water interaction in the light of legitimacy as
an analytical lens grounded on the legal framework. Furthermore, not all watercourse
states are party to these conventions. The landscape of international water law is
broader than the UNWC and UNECEWC. International environmental law regimes,
such as those under the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance
especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Convention)61 and the 1992 Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD),62 are undoubtedly of importance as well for new
58 ‘Iran, Afghanistan Open Talks on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’, TasnimNews Agency, 19 June
2017, available at: https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2017/06/19/1440459/iran-afghanistan-open-
talks-on-comprehensive-strategic-partnership.
59
‘Afghanistan, Turkmenistan Sign Bilateral Agreements’, Tolo News, 4 July 2017, available at:
https://www.tolonews.com/business/afghanistan-turkmenistan-sign-bilateral-agreements.
60 N. 19 above.
61 Ramsar (Iran), 2 Feb. 1971, in force 21 Dec. 1975, available at: https://www.ramsar.org; as amended
by the Paris Protocol, Paris (France), 3 Dec 1982, in force 1 Oct. 1986, available at: https://www.ramsar.
org/document/the-paris-protocol-to-the-ramsar-convention-on-wetlands; and the Regina Amendments,
Regina, SK (Canada), 28 May 1987, in force 1 May 1994, available at: https://www.ramsar.org/docu-
ment/the-regina-amendments-to-the-convention-on-wetlands.
62 Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), 5 June 1992, in force 29 Dec. 1993, available at: https://www.cbd.int.
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infrastructure projects on international watercourses.Moreover, the concept of legitim-
acy unavoidably requires broader scrutiny than merely analyzing sources of inter-
national water or environmental law and human rights law, since concepts of
distributive justice and equity also play a role in assessing legitimacy.
The literature on the management of international watercourses has addressed the
relationship between legitimacy and distributive justice. Yihdego and Rieu-Clarke
describe legitimacy as ‘procedural fairness’ and associate distributive justice with sub-
stantive principles of international water law.63 The authors argue that ‘procedural
fairness [legitimacy] and distributive justice [substantive rules], as normative standards,
constitute two sides of the same coin, which, in turn, demands that both are considered
together when analysing the merits of transboundary treaty frameworks’.64
International water law, and particularly the UNWC, demonstrate a signiﬁcant correl-
ation between these functions. For instance, Articles 6 and 11–19 UNWC show a clear
linkage between the substantive principles of equitable utilization and the procedural
obligations within the duty to cooperate, notify and consult. We will now analyze
the various sources that can inform an assessment of legitimacy.
3.2. Sovereignty
The starting point for assessing the legitimacy of dam development on a shared water-
course is still the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty is a key reference point for inter-
national water utilization doctrines.65 On the one hand, a state has sovereignty over its
natural resources as well as the right of development. The sovereign right to exploit nat-
ural resources should indeed not impose harmful effects on other states. As an accepted
principle of international law, which is recognized by the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) and tribunals in several cases such as the Lake Lanoux Arbitration,66 states have
the sovereign right to utilize their natural resources.67 Therefore, unilaterally damming
a shared watercourse could be justiﬁed by the sovereign right of that particular state
with absolute territorial sovereignty. However, the sovereignty of states is not absolute.
The scope of its application is limited to speciﬁc circumstances.68 The ICJ in the
Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros case held that the right of a sovereign state unilaterally to
build a dam on a shared watercourse completely within its territory is still subject to
particular limitations. There is, ﬁrstly, the duty not to cause signiﬁcant transboundary
damage and, secondly, the duty to respect the equitable and reasonable utilization of a
63 For a detailed discussion, see Yihdego & Rieu-Clarke, n. 3 above.
64 Ibid., p. 545 (added text inside square brackets).
65 R.L. Farnum, S. Hawkins & M. Tamarin, ‘Hydro-Hegemons and International Water Law’, in
A. Rieu-Clarke, A. Allan & S. Hendry (eds), Routledge Handbook of Water Law and Policy (Taylor
& Francis, 2017), pp. 297–310.
66 Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain), Arbitral Tribunal, 16 Nov. 1957, (1957) 12 Reports of
International Arbitral Awards, p. 281.
67 See R. Pereira&O. Gough, ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in the 21st Century: Natural
Resource Governance and the Right to Self-determination of Indigenous Peoples under International
Law’ (2013) 14(2)Melbourne Journal of International Law, pp. 451–95.
68 Y. Tyagi, ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’ (2015) 4(3) Cambridge Journal of
International & Comparative Law, pp. 588–615, at 588.
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shared watercourse.69 As a result, a riparian statewill have the right to build a dam on a
shared watercourse but such a right is limited and the state must comply with other
international obligations. This reasoning signiﬁes that limited territorial sovereignty
is now the accepted theory for the utilization of shared watercourses in international
law.70
Moreover, water has always been considered separately from other natural resources
because of the unique dependence of humans onwater. The literature therefore refers to
an at-best limited but not absolute sovereignty over a shared watercourse.71 In sum, the
state of origin will have the basic right to utilize the shared watercourse, but this
utilization must comply with the international obligations of the state of origin.72
This balanced approach is reﬂected precisely in the concept of equitable and reasonable
utilization of the watercourse.73
3.3. The 1997 UN Watercourses Convention
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice74 outlines international
conventions, international customary law and the general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations as the main sources of international law. Keeping these sources in
mind, the question of which formal obligations under international law govern the con-
struction of a dam is particularly complex in this particular case, as there is no formal
treaty between Turkmenistan, Iran and Afghanistan that covers the issue. As a result,
two treaties could potentially play a role: the UNECEWC,75 and the UNWC.76 Since
riparian states in the case of the Harirud River dam have not acceded to either
Convention, with the exception of Turkmenistan’s membership of the
69 See S.McCaffrey, ‘The Contribution of the UNConvention on the Law of theNon-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses’ (2001) 1(3–4) International Journal of Global Environmental Issues,
pp. 250–63.
70 Farnum, Hawkins & Tamarin, n. 65 above, p. 301.
71 J.W. Dellapenna, ‘Treaties as Instruments for Managing Internationally Shared Water Resources:
Restricted Sovereignty vs. Community of Property’ (1994) 26(1) Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law, pp. 27–56, at 27; see also C. Mendis, ‘Sovereignty vs. Transboundary
Environmental Harm: The Evolving International Law Obligations and the Sethusamuduram Ship
Channel Project’, UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Ofﬁce of Legal Affairs, 2006.
72 See further N. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge
University Press, 1997), pp. 231–52.
73 See also L. Chiussi, ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses’, in M. Fitzmaurice, A. Tanzi & A. Papantoniou (eds), Multilateral
Environmental Treaties (Edward Elgar, 2017), pp. 247–56, at 251 (arguing that the roots of the
norm of equitable and reasonable use are to be found in the necessity to elaborate a mediating paradigm
of redistributive justice between the absolute territorial sovereignty of the upstream state to use and con-
sume thewaters of the international watercourse and the absolute territorial integrity of the downstream
state). See also McCaffrey, n. 69 above, and see S. Pahuja, Decolonising International Law:
Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality (Cambridge University Press, 2013).
74 San Francisco, CA (US), 26 June 1945, in force 24 Oct. 1945, available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/en/
statute.
75 C. Contartese, ‘Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes 1992 (The UNECE Helsinki Convention)’, in Fitzmaurice, Tanzi & Papantoniou,
n. 73 above, pp. 257–68.
76 Chiussi, n. 73 above, pp. 247–56; P. Sands & J. Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law,
3rd edn (Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 310–12.
Transnational Environmental Law, 8:2 (2019), pp. 247–278260
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2047102519000128
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Northumbria University Library, on 19 Jul 2019 at 11:05:25, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
UNECEWC,77 neither the UNWC nor the UNECEWC is formally binding in this case.
While each Convention could make a positive contribution to strengthening trans-
boundary water cooperation,78 the emphasis of this article is placed on the UNWC.
Far more than the UNECEWC, the UNWC reﬂects the substantive and pro-
cedural norms of customary international law, in particular under the principle of
equitable and reasonable utilization.79 For the formation of customary international
law two elements are required: opinio juris and state practice. In this connection,
the UNWC was adopted by the UN General Assembly after preparatory work by the
International Law Commission (ILC). The ILC plays an important role in the
identiﬁcation of customary law.
Furthermore, the UNWC consists of substantive and procedural norms that are com-
pletely interrelated. Substantive norms can be listed brieﬂy as equitable and reasonable
utilization, the no-harm principle, and a general obligation to cooperate. Procedural
norms provide guidelines to states on how to implement their substantive obligations
and include the obligation to exchange data and information regularly, to provide
information concerning planned measures, and further consultation on the potential
effects of such planned measures. All these principles form part of the corpus of inter-
national law and reﬂect customary international law,80 which means that they are bind-
ing upon all states.81 This argument is supported by decisions of the ICJ in the
Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros (Hungary/Slovakia) case82 as well as in Pulp Mills on
the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay).83 Furthermore, the global inﬂuence of
the UNWC is demonstrated in state practice – namely, the development of water treaty
arrangements such as the Southern African Development Community Revised Protocol
77 Turkmenistan ofﬁcially joined the 1992 UNECEWC on 29 Aug. 2012.
78 Considering the similarities and differences between the Conventions and the fact that they are currently
in operation at the global level, promoting and implementing both Conventions as a ‘package’ creates
more synergistic beneﬁts beyond that of either Convention standing alone. Rieu‐Clarke and Kinna sug-
gest a ‘package approach’ to the implementation of both Conventions in order to strengthen the law of
international watercourses: A. Rieu‐Clarke & R. Kinna, ‘Can Two Global UN Water Conventions
Effectively Co‐exist? Making the Case for a “Package Approach” to Support Institutional
Coordination’ (2014) 23(1) Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law,
pp. 15–31.
79 F.R. Loures, A. Rieu-Clarke & W. Joseph, ‘The Authority and Function of the UN Watercourses
Convention’, in F.R. Loures & A. Rieu-Clarke (eds), The UN Watercourses Convention in Force:
Strengthening International Law for Transboundary Water Management (Routledge, 2013), pp. 49–
66, at 52; see also A.S. Rieu-Clarke, ‘The UN Watercourse Convention’, in A. Rieu-Clarke, A. Allan
& S. Hendry (eds), Routledge Handbook of Water Law and Policy (Taylor & Francis, 2017),
pp. 193–204, at 194.
80 These core principles have formed the bedrock of bi- and multilateral agreements: see L. Boisson de
Chazournes, Fresh Water in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2013). The principles are
also centred on the 2008 ILC Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, 2008(II)
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Part 2 (Draft Aquifer Articles), available at:
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/8_5_2008.pdf, and the 1992 UNECEWC.
81 McCaffrey, n. 69 above.
82 Gabcˇikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment (Merits), 25 Sept. 1977, ICJ Reports
(1997), p. 7.
83 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v.Uruguay), Judgment, 20 Apr. 2010, ICJ Reports (2010),
p. 14.
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on Shared Watercourses,84 and the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement.85
The UNWC, therefore, partly codiﬁes customary international law in this ﬁeld.
In addition, considering that the contemporary international order is grounded on
consent and self-interest, states have a conservative approach towards entering into far-
reaching, binding detailed commitments and prefer ‘looser and more ﬂexible “frame-
work” agreements’.86 In this regard, by exploring similarities and differences, Tanzi
concludes that, in general, the UNECEWCprovidesmore detail with regard to practical
matters and institutional arrangements compared with the UNWC.87 Hence, the
UNWC represents perhaps a more acceptable legal framework for states by requiring
general duties and rights. It is therefore instructive to look at the UNWC as a global
instrument adopted by the ILC in order to address the principles of international cus-
tomary law. We discuss each principle in more detail in the following sections.
3.4. The Equitable and Reasonable Utilization Principle
To resolve the challenges of states in utilizing shared water resources, several doctrines
have been adopted by states and by international instruments.88 Four theoretical prin-
ciples – including territorial sovereignty, territorial integrity, equitable utilization, and
common management – have been used in allocating the resources of watercourses.89
Among these principles, equitable utilization represents customary international law.90
This principle states simply that the substantial interests of all riparian states should be
reconciled in the most effective way.
The equitable and reasonable utilization of shared watercourses is one of the funda-
mental principles of international water law. According to McIntyre, it implies that the
utilization of a shared watercourse should be conducted by taking into account a list of
factors which allow the assessment of, and respect for, the interests of all the water-
course states involved.91 Therefore, the equitable and reasonable utilization principle
requires the implementation of a decision-making strategy in which various aspects
of the utilization of a shared watercourse must be examined. In addition, the principle
84 Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the Southern African Development
Community, Windhoek, Namibia (South Africa), 7 Aug. 2000, in force 22 Sept. 2003, available
at: https://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/1975.
85 Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework, 1 Aug. 2009, available at: http://www.inter
nationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/Nile_River_Basin_Cooperative_Framework_2010.pdf.
86 D. Armstrong, T. Farrell & H. Lambert, International Law and International Relations (Cambridge
University Press, 2012), p. 288.
87 See further A. Tanzi,The Consolidation of InternationalWater Law: AComparative Analysis of the UN
andUNECEWater Conventions (Editoriale Scientiﬁca Napoli, 2017). See further also Contartese, n. 75
above, pp. 265–6.
88 See S. Dinar, International Water Treaties: Negotiation and Cooperation along Transboundary Rivers
(Routledge, 2007), pp. 39–41.
89 N. Islam, The Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Options for Regional
Regime-Building in Asia, Vol. 8 (Kluwer Law International, 2010), pp. 102–11.
90 It is reﬂected in the UNWC and Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers, n. 80 above. See further
Dellapenna, n. 71 above.
91 O. McIntyre, Environmental Protection of International Watercourses under International Law
(Routledge, 2016).
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of equitable and reasonable utilization of a shared watercourse was expressly consid-
ered as part of customary international law in the ICJ decision concerning the
Gabcˇikovo-Nagymaros project, a conﬂict between Hungary and Slovakia which also
involved the construction of a dam.92 The principle is also articulated in Article 5
UNWC and in Article 12 of the Berlin Rules 2004.93 Hence, there is no doubt that
unless otherwise agreed by riparian states, such states are obliged to use shared water-
courses in an equitable and reasonable manner.94 The question which may arise is how
such equitable and reasonable utilization should be deﬁned and agreed by the riparian
states.
Several concerns arise regarding the evaluation of equitable and reasonable utiliza-
tion. As McCaffrey correctly asks, ‘how can an upstream state know if it is using an
international watercourse in an equitable manner?’95 In the absence of joint manage-
ment of a shared watercourse, it may be difﬁcult to determine whether a shared water-
course is used equitably and reasonably. Article 6 UNWC lists, in a non-exhaustive
manner, a number of factors that should be considered in evaluating equitable and rea-
sonable utilization, such as population dependence, the availability of alternatives, and
the effects of the shared water utilization. Riparian states, therefore, must utilize the
shared water by considering these factors and by taking into account the interests of
other riparian states as well as the ecosystem of the shared watercourse. There could
still be a challenge for an equitable balancing of the diversity of state interests, as imple-
menting these factors without reference to political intent would be onerous. Therefore,
some authors express concern about the practical application of these factors.96
Moreover, each riparian state may have a different evaluation of these factors and
give different weight to them, which may also lead to disagreement among riparian
states. Other authors suggest that equitable utilization should be determined with ref-
erence to fairness and norms of distributive justice.97 Therefore, the interests of riparian
states should be taken into consideration in the evaluation of these factors. This implies
that such evaluations of fairness and distributive justice in the context of water alloca-
tion should not be rendered without particular attention being paid to the special needs
of the least developed states. In this connection, one may argue that distributional
92 Gabcˇikovo-Nagymaros (Hungary v. Slovakia), n. 82 above.
93 The Berlin Rules on Water Resources were approved by the Water Resources Law Committee of the
International Law Association (ILA) in 2004. These Rules set out customary international law relating
to freshwater resources: ILA, Report of the 71st Conference 3, (2004) 71 ILA 337, 385.
94 See further McCaffrey, n. 69 above; and J.W. Dellapenna, ‘The Customary International Law of
Transboundary Fresh Waters’ (2001) 1(3–4) International Journal of Global Environmental Issues,
pp. 264–305. See also F. Daibes-Murad, A New Legal Framework for Managing the World’s Shared
Groundwaters (IWA Publishing, 2005), p. 97; and Islam, n. 89 above, p. 161.
95 McCaffrey, n. 69 above.
96 Dellapenna, n. 71 above. For a discussion of different perspectives on deﬁning ‘justice’ and ‘equity’, see
also M. Zeitoun et al., ‘Transboundary Water Justice: A Combined Reading of Literature on Critical
Transboundary Water Interaction and “Justice”, for Analysis and Diplomacy’ (2014) 16(S2) Water
Policy, pp. 174–93.
97 O. McIntyre, ‘Utilization of Shared International Freshwater Resources: The Meaning and Role of
“Equity” in International Water Law’ (2013) 38(2) Water International, pp. 112–29; see also
U. Trilochan, International Watercourses Law and Its Application in South Asia (Pairavi Prakashan,
2006), pp. 108–9.
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equity requires richer states to provide assistance to poorer states in order to enable
them to utilize shared watercourses in a more efﬁcient manner.98
These concerns regarding the evaluation of equitable and reasonable utilization
serve as an important rationale for the implementation of procedural obligations. As
a result, only through an effective implementation of procedural obligations could sub-
stantive obligations be fully evaluated and complied with by the riparian states.
3.5. The No-Harm Principle
The no-harm principle is widely expressed in the case law of the ICJ and is articulated in
several international and regional legal instruments.99 It is cited in the Trail Smelter
Arbitration,100 the Corfu Channel,101 the Nuclear Tests,102 and the Pulp Mills103
cases. It is also reﬂected in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration104 and
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration,105 the ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities 2001,106 Article 7 UNWC, and
many other international instruments.
For example, in the Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain)107 Spain argued that
a French plan to divert water from Lake Lanoux to generate hydro-electric energy
would violate its water rights under a series of treaties and brought the case before
an arbitration tribunal. The tribunal rejected Spain’s arguments because the French
plan would not alter the volume of water entering Spain. Here, the tribunal relied on
98 McIntyre, ibid., pp. 126–8: see also M. Zeitoun, ‘The Relevance of International Water Law to
Later-Developing Upstream States’ (2015) 40(7)Water International, pp. 949–68.
99 See, e.g., J. Albers, Responsibility and Liability in the Context of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes by Sea: Existing Rules and the 1999 Liability Protocol to the Basel Convention,
Vol. 29 (Springer, 2014), p. 152.
100 Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal, 16 Apr. 1938,
3 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, p. 1905, at 1911–37.
101 Corfu Channel Case (UnitedKingdom v.Albania), Judgment (Merits), 9 Apr. 1949, ICJReports (1949),
p. 4, at 43.
102 Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), Judgment, 20 Dec. 1974, ICJ Reports (1974), p. 253;Nuclear
Tests Case (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, 20 Dec. 1974 ICJ Reports (1974), p. 457.
103 N. 83 above.
104 Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment, adopted by the UN Conference on
Environment and Development, Stockholm (Sweden), 5–16 June 1972, UN Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1,
available at: http://www.un-documents.net/aconf48-14r1.pdf.
105 Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted by the UN Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED), Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), 3–14 June 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1
(Vol. I), Annex I, available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm;
Agenda 21: A Programme for Action for Sustainable Development, Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), 3–14
June 1992, in Report of the UNCED, Annex II, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. II) (1992);
Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the
Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of all Types of Forests, Rio de Janeiro
(Brazil), 13 Jun. 1992, in Report of the UNCED, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. III), available at:
https://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-3.htm.
106 Adopted by the ILC at its 53rd session in 2001, and submitted to the UN General Assembly as a part of
the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (UN Doc. A/56/10). The report, which also
contains commentaries on the draft articles, appears in 2001(II) Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, Part Two.
107 N. 66 above.
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the French promise to return water to Spain. If the volume of water entering Spain had
reduced signiﬁcantly, perhaps the award of the tribunal would have been different.108
Therefore, the no-harm principle as a customary rule is undoubtedly applicable and
binding upon states. Article 3 of the ILC Draft Articles of 2001 expresses that ‘the
[s]tate of origin shall take all appropriate measures to prevent signiﬁcant transbound-
ary harm or at any event to minimize the risk thereof’. Similarly, but more limited in
coverage, Article 7 UNWC requires watercourse states to take all appropriate measures
to prevent causing signiﬁcant harm to other watercourse states in utilizing an
international watercourse in their territories.
In general, this principle limits the scope of the sovereign rights of states.109 The
sovereign right of a state to exploit its own resources is limited by the responsibility
to ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
This principle also implies that the state in which any activity is planned (the state of
origin) should take all appropriate measures to prevent causing signiﬁcant transbound-
ary damage beyond its territory or control.
Transboundary damage refers to any adverse impact that results from activities car-
ried out in one country which cause signiﬁcant damage in the territory of another coun-
try. Hence, four elements need to be present for transboundary damage to occur: (i) a
human cause of transboundary damage; (ii) signiﬁcant adverse impacts; (iii) a causal
link between activities carried out in the territory of, or under the control of, one coun-
try and harm incurred in the territory of another state; and (iv) the transboundary
movement of such harmful impact.110 If transboundary damage is established, the prin-
ciple places a due diligence obligation upon the state of origin to take all appropriate
measures. This raises the question of which measures are considered appropriate?
Unsurprisingly, states have a great deal of discretion in choosing appropriate measures.
Generally, states have the authority to decide which measures should be taken and
which activities should be governed by preventive measures.111 Furthermore, if a devel-
opment over a river basin reﬂects the criteria of the equitable and reasonable utilization
principle, it arguably meets the no-harm principle. Similar to the principle of equitable
and reasonable utilization, the no-harm principle can be perceived through a substan-
tive and a procedural lens. The substantive aspects of the principle deal with the thresh-
old of transboundary damage. The procedural dimension of no harm clariﬁes the
speciﬁc obligations with which states should comply to prevent transboundary dam-
age. The substantive and procedural implications of the no-harm principle, however,
have been developed in different instruments.
According to Article 7 UNWC, watercourse states should prevent the causing of sig-
niﬁcant harm to other watercourse states. Therefore, the threshold that is used for
108 See also the Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v. India), Permanent Court of Arbitration
(PCA), Final Award, 20 Dec. 2013, ICGJ 478 (PCA 2013).
109 Cf. Section 3.2.
110 H. Xue, Transboundary Damage in International Law, Vol. 27 (Cambridge University Press, 2003),
pp. 4–10.
111 Zeitoun, n. 98 above.
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qualifying transboundary damage is ‘signiﬁcance’: the obligation of watercourse states
is limited to the duty not to cause signiﬁcant transboundary harm.112 The same thresh-
old is used in the ILC Draft Articles of 2001. Meanwhile, neither instrument gives any
further indication of the activities coming within the scope of the deﬁned threshold.
Only the ILC indicates that it includes activities which are not prohibited under inter-
national law. Hence, the utilization of a shared watercourse, which as Article 7 con-
ﬁrms is not prohibited under international law, could still be considered unlawful
and beyond the legitimate rights of each of the riparian states. If it leads to constant
transboundary damage to other riparian states, this use could be considered unlawful
utilization unless due diligence has been exercised.
However, there remains a question of the circumstances in which the utilization of
shared watercourses could be considered lawful but leads to transboundary damage.
In dealing with this question, McIntyre links the no-harm principle with the principle
of equitable utilization. He further argues that the prohibition on causing signiﬁcant
harm could be reached only by taking into account factors that are relevant to the appli-
cation of the principle of equitable utilization, and many of these factors are environ-
mental in nature. Hence, in evaluating these factors, as a substantive implication of
the no-harm principle in the shared watercourse, one should consider the environmen-
tal impacts of utilizing such a shared watercourse. Furthermore, the notion of sustain-
ability implies that the interests of all communities related to the shared watercourse, as
well as environmental factors, should be given priority in using that watercourse.
Hence, McIntyre concludes that preventing transboundary damage to a large extent
is included within the determination of a reasonable and equitable regime.113
Some commentators claim that, taking into account the position of the no-harm
principle in customary international law, it should be given primacy over the equitable
and reasonable utilization principle.114 Others maintain that the equitable and reason-
able utilization principle should be given priority over the no-harm principle.115
Indeed, the obligation of watercourse states to prevent transboundary damage should
not be considered without taking into account other provisions set out in the UNWC.
Any development of a shared watercourse may cause harm to other riparian states,
however slight.116 Therefore, inevitably an upstream state will cause some degree of
harm to a downstream state through its use of a shared watercourse. In the light of
recent developments in international law, arguably the no-harm and equitable and rea-
sonable utilization principles should be interpreted in combination with other inter-
national norms such as sustainable development. One may argue, therefore, that the
equitable and reasonable utilization principle is ﬂexible enough to imply an additional
obligation not to cause signiﬁcant harm. As a result, it is possible to interpret the
112 See further Chiussi, n. 73 above, p. 252.
113 McIntyre, n. 91 above, p. 105.
114 See Daibes-Murad, n. 94 above, p. 92.
115 See S.M.A. Salman, TheWorld Bank Policy for Projects on InternationalWaterways: AnHistorical and
Legal Analysis (World Bank, 2009), p. 96.
116 S. McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses (Oxford University Press, 2007), Ch. 10–11.
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UNWC in a manner that avoids difﬁculties and disputes over the interpretation of the
principle of equitable and reasonable utilization and the principle of no signiﬁcant
harm; this is resolved by giving priority to the former principle while giving the latter
special status.117
3.6. The Obligation to Cooperate
The duty to cooperate is generally accepted as customary international law and is
reﬂected in several regional and international instruments.118 The duty of notiﬁcation
is also an autonomous requirement of customary international law (and usually of con-
ventional arrangements) and is equally central to an effective implementation of both
the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization and the duty to prevent signiﬁcant
transboundary harm.119 The duty is articulated in Article 8 UNWC and, as a result,
watercourse states are obliged to cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial
integrity, mutual beneﬁt and good faith in order to attain optimal utilization and
adequate protection of an international watercourse. Arguably, implementation of
the substantive obligations without clear respect for the procedural obligations
would be otiose. Similarly, Article 4 of the ILC Draft Articles on the Prevention of
Transboundary Harm requires the states concerned to cooperate in good faith in pre-
venting signiﬁcant transboundary harm or minimizing the risk thereof.
Generally, states have a duty to cooperate over the utilization and management of
shared watercourses, but the legal implications of this duty remain somewhat ambigu-
ous. The cooperation principle by deﬁnition is an abstract rule and the speciﬁc obliga-
tions of states concerned should be clearly expressed.120 According to Article 9
UNWC, watercourse states are further obliged to regularly exchange data and informa-
tion on the condition of the watercourse. This could be considered one of the speciﬁc
obligations of states under the general obligation to cooperate. Thus, the obligation to
cooperate could be treated as a general framework under which several other speciﬁc
obligations should be fulﬁlled by the states concerned. These speciﬁc obligations, as
they are set out in Part III UNWC in respect of planned measures, clearly ﬁt within
the general duty to cooperate. Indeed, according to Part III, states are obliged to
exchange information and consult each other and, if necessary, negotiate on the planned
measures which may have a signiﬁcant adverse effect on other watercourse states.
Sophisticated notiﬁcation, consultation and negotiation arrangements are provided in
Part III, and states are required to comply with these arrangements. However,
Article 24 UNWC requires watercourse states to enter into consultations concerning
the management of the international watercourse, at the request of any of them.
‘Management’ is deﬁned in Article 24 as: (a) planning the sustainable development of
117 A. Rieu-Clarke, R. Moynihan and B.-O. Magsig, UN Watercourses Convention User’s Guide
(IHP-HELP Centre for Water Law, Policy and Sciences (under the auspices of UNESCO), 2012).
118 C. Leb, Co-operation in the Law of Transboundary Water Resources, Vol. 102 (Cambridge University
Press, 2013), pp. 80–2.
119 Chiussi, n. 73 above, p. 253.
120 McCaffrey, n. 116 above, p. 470.
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an international watercourse and providing for the implementation of any plans
adopted; and (b) otherwise promoting the rational and optimal utilization, protection,
and control of the watercourse. Hence, it seems that such consultation is wider than
that concerning planned measures and includes a wider scope, such as the establishment
of a joint management mechanism for utilization of the shared watercourse.
A similar but broader approach is adopted in the ILC Draft Articles on the
Prevention of Transboundary Harm. Article 6 holds that the state of origin should
require prior authorization for any activity carried out in its territory, or otherwise
under its jurisdiction or control, which may lead to signiﬁcant transboundary harm.
Further, Article 7 requires the state of origin to assess the possible transboundary
harm caused by that activity via an environmental impact assessment (EIA).
Article 9 requires the state of origin to provide states likely to be affected with timely
notiﬁcation of the assessment and all available technical and other relevant information
on which the assessment is based. Further, at the request of any of the states concerned,
in order to prevent signiﬁcant transboundary harm they should engage in consultation
within a reasonable time frame. Interestingly, in Article 9(2) the ILC suggests that the
objective is to reach an equitable balance of interests, as it conﬁrms that states should
employ ‘best efforts’ to comply with information requests from other watercourse
states, but may condition compliance upon payment of reasonable costs. Article 10
further determines the factors related to an equitable balance of interests.
The ILC Draft Articles require of the state of origin a regular exchange of informa-
tion while the activity is being carried out, and provision of information to the public
likely to be affected by an activity within the scope of the Draft Articles. Interestingly,
the ILC expects the state of origin to take into account the interests of a state likely to be
affected, even if consultation failed to produce an agreed solution. Obligations such as
conducting a (transboundary) EIA are necessary to ensure a meaningful implementa-
tion of the duty to notify other watercourse states of planned measures likely to affect
them. Such an EIA forms the basis for follow-on obligations which might prove neces-
sary, including duties to consult and negotiate in good faith. Therefore, the develop-
ment in international law requires a state of origin to conduct an EIA which
considers the interests of states likely to be affected. This is reﬂected in the 2010
judgment of the ICJ in Pulp Mills as customary international law.121 Hence, there is
no doubt that conducting an EIA which considers the interests of the state likely to
be affected and its local community is a speciﬁc obligation required by international
law.
Accordingly, the effective implementation of both the equitable and reasonable util-
ization principle and the no-harm principle are heavily reliant upon procedural require-
ments. Thus, procedural principles, which relate to the general obligation of states to
cooperate, not only serve as a basis for avoiding disputes and strengthening cooperation
over international watercourses, but also support the substantive principles.
121 See S. Marsden, Transboundary Environmental Governance: Inland, Coastal and Marine Perspectives
(Routledge, 2016), p. 281.
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3.7. Other Legal Sources
This brief overview of the state of customary international law related to dam construc-
tion in a shared watercourse shows clearly that when a state has the intention to build
such a damwhich may have negative impacts on the quantity of water to be received by
the downstream state(s), the state of origin is required to meet various obligations
which are part of the corpus of international law and are binding upon all states.
Putting international water law obligations aside, such international obligations
could be further analyzed from three perspectives: (i) international environmental
law, (ii) human rights, and (iii) equity concerns. Environmental legal instruments,
such as the Ramsar Convention,122 require parties to implement their planning to pro-
mote the conservation of wetlands and, as far as possible, the wise use of wetlands in
their territory. Therefore, riparian states could also be obliged to take speciﬁc action
to protect the ecosystem of a shared watercourse. In such cases, riparian states should
inform other riparian states or organizations if the ecological character of the shared
watercourse is changing or is likely to change as a result of technological developments.
Moreover, other sources of international environmental law, such as the 1992 CBD,123
could be signiﬁcant in the assessment of transboundary water damage. The assessment
does notmerely relate to the damage caused by inequitablewater use per se, but extends
to broader secondary impacts concerning environmental issues, which are also covered
in the Stockholm Declaration124 and the Rio Declaration.
The construction of a dam in an international watercourse has the potential also to
have a negative effect on human rights.125 It could lead to the displacement of particu-
lar (often vulnerable) groups. Without adequately considering the interests of indigen-
ous people, such a development may also endanger indigenous water rights.126
Construction by an upstream state also frequently takes place to guarantee drinking
water for its population, but may at the same time reduce the water supply for down-
stream users. Arguably, any utilization of a shared watercourse which restricts access to
fresh water from that watercourse is inequitable. Therefore, the right towater should be
respected, irrespective of the position of the state involved, in proportion to the actual
needs of riparian states.127 This equally raises the question of how dam construction
relates to the fundamental right to water. Both the international community and
authoritative human rights bodies increasingly recognize a human right to water.
Under Articles 11 and 12 of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social
122 N. 61 above.
123 N. 62 above.
124 On the 1972 Stockholm UN Conference on the Human Environment see Sands & Peel, n. 76 above,
pp. 30–2.
125 On the relationship between environmental protection and human rights see Sands & Peel, n. 76 above,
pp. 777–80.
126 M. Finn & S. Jackson, ‘Protecting Indigenous Values in Water Management: A Challenge to
Conventional Environmental Flow Assessments’ (2011) 14(8) Ecosystems, pp. 1232–48.
127 T.S. Bulto, The Extraterritorial Application of the Human Right to Water in Africa (Cambridge
University Press, 2014), p. 194.
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and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)128 the right to water is legally binding.129 General
Comment 15 – adopted in 2002 by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, which monitors the implementation of the ICESCR – provides that
‘the human right towater is indispensable for leading a life in human dignity. It is a pre-
requisite for the realization of other human rights’. All three riparian states of the
Harirud Basin have ratiﬁed and acceded to the ICESCR, yet this provision is not applied
to individuals outside the territory as the states in question have not voted on the
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR.
Ultimately, the concept of ‘equity’ and its applicability in international law have
received scattered support through state practice and international tribunal awards.130
Equity could have three functions in the context of transboundary shared watercourses:
(i) to assess the equitable share of riparian states; (ii) to ensure that all relevant circum-
stances and stakeholders are taken into consideration; and (iii) to determine the govern-
ing law and its application.131 As discussed in Section 3.4, in its normative function
shared water utilization will have the capacity to meet the needs of equity.
Nevertheless, as McIntyre argues, the formulation of the equitable and reasonable util-
ization principle does not provide guidance for the true realization of an equitable out-
come.132 Therefore, it is necessary to invoke other principles such as that of common
but differentiated responsibility of states.133 It is not possible within the limited
scope of this article to further develop those other aspects. It is, however, important
to recognize that the assessment of the legitimacy of dam construction necessarily
involves more than merely an analysis of international water law.
3.8. Summary
Assessing the legitimacy of dam construction according to international law requires
the incorporation of a wide variety of factors. Focusing exclusively on international
water law, it can be held that the legitimacy of such construction depends not only
on states’ compliance with substantive norms such as equitable utilization and the
no-harm principle, but equally on their procedural duty to cooperate, as well as the
duty to notify. More particularly, the latter obligation is of crucial importance as it
can facilitate a culture of communication among co-riparian states by providing a
shared language, common understandings and several starting points for structured
interstate discussions. Moreover, since the adoption of the UNWC, the concept of
128 New York, NY (US), 16 Dec. 1966, in force 3 Jan. 1976, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx.
129 See I. Biglino & C. Golay, The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Academy In-Brief No. 2, (Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law
and Human Rights, 2013).
130 McIntyre, n. 91 above.
131 R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International law and How We Use It (Clarendon Press, 1994),
p. 220.
132 McIntyre, n. 91 above.
133 T. Deleuil, ‘The Common But Differentiated Responsibilities Principle: Changes in Continuity after the
Durban Conference of the Parties’ (2012) 21(3) Review of European Community & International
Environmental Law, pp. 271–81.
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integrated water resources management has been developed, which implies the neces-
sity to address the legitimacy of dam construction not merely by focusing simply on
one dam (the Salma Dam), but by looking at water management in an integrated
manner (in this instance, for example, looking equally at the impacts of the Doosti
Dam). A ﬁnal assessment of legitimacy might even go beyond water and environmental
law to include an analysis of human rights aspects and equity considerations. Thus, a
holistic analysis of the legitimacy of dam construction entails a complicated exercise
that includes all relevant dimensions in the river basin in question.
Before proceeding to such a legitimacy assessment, the next section considers the
probable impacts caused by the construction of the SalmaDam. This analysis will facili-
tate an examination of whether, in building the Salma Dam, Afghanistan has complied
with its international obligations.
4.      
   
4.1. Flow Regime in Different Possible Conditions (Cases)
Iran and Turkmenistan jointly built the Doosti Dam in 2004. On the other side,
Afghanistan opened the Salma Dam in 2016. The focus of this part of the study is
the assessment of the probable impacts of the Salma Dam (located in the upper reaches
of the Harirud Basin) on the downstream area. As no impacts of the Salma Dam have
yet been reported, it should be noted that these impacts are assessed based on a simu-
lation in a technical model. The following simulations are based on potential impacts of
the dam in the near future. This section will ﬁrst discuss those impacts while Section 5
will assess those negative consequences in light of relevant international law principles.
Using theWater Evaluation and Planning System (WEAP) technical model,134 along
with available data covering the past 43 years, it is possible to take into account various
demand priorities and supply preferences and to simulate various possible case scen-
arios. These simulations relate to water supply and demand, based on socio-economic
developments and hydrological changes in the basin. They have been modelled based
on certain assumptions, such as what the situation would be in a case of there being
no dams in the basin (Case 1 under normal hydrological conditions), or in a case
where both the Salma Dam and Doosti Dam are operational (Case 2 in normal hydro-
logical conditions). Cases 3 and 4 are the same as Case 2 with the addition of experi-
encing severe conditions of respectively a 25% and a 50% reduction of water ﬂow in
the dry season.135 It is important to note that, technically, it usually takes time until
134 A large number of studies use the WEAP system to develop a water resources planning tool for trans-
boundary and international river basins: see, e.g., H. Hoff et al., ‘A Water Resources Planning Tool
for the Jordan River Basin’ (2011) 3(3) Water, pp. 718–36; J.C. White, T.W. Tanton &
D.W. Rycroft, ‘The Impact of Climate Change on the Water Resources of the Amu Darya Basin in
Central Asia’ (2014) 28(15)Water Resources Management, pp. 5267–81.
135 This means that the inﬂow of the river in normal hydrological conditions will reduce by 25% and 50%
as a result of a possible natural decline in precipitation.
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the actual impacts of a dam construction are observed in the downstream. Therefore,
since no data is available regarding the actual impacts of the Salma Dam on the ﬂow
regime of the downstream area at this time, this study relies on the WEAP to simulate
probable impacts.
The results of the WEAP simulation reveal the negative future impacts of the con-
struction of the Salma Dam in Afghanistan on the water ﬂow regime downstream, in
Iran and Turkmenistan. It is expected that the discharge of water downstream will
be reduced by approximately 30% to 80% in different scenarios. In addition, eco-
logical conditions in the downstream area of the Salma and Doosti Dams, particularly
in Turkmenistan, are forecast to be severely damaged by the development of the dam in
the upstream area.
4.2. Impacts of the Dams on the Water Flow Regime
Considering the above assumptions, Table 3 shows the annual inﬂow that is simulated
and predicted to have reached the Iranian border in the various assumed cases in the last
10 years of the time period as a result of the construction of the Salma Dam.
Table 3 shows that the construction of the Salma Dam in Afghanistan is likely
to reduce the average annual ﬂow in Case 2 in comparison with Case 1 (a 30%
reduction compared with when the Salma Dam is not operated). The impact is much
worse in Cases 3 and 4 during possible dry climatic conditions (around 70%–80%).
In addition, the maximum annual inﬂow is forecast to decline from 3,137.42 MCM
(Case 1 – without the Salma Dam) to 2,719.40 MCM (Case 2 – with the Salma
Dam). The results also show that the number of years in which the annual ﬂow falls
below 51.59 MCM (which is the actual minimum annual ﬂow in the natural case)
and 200 MCM (which is the required minimum annual environmental ﬂow) is pre-
dicted to increase dramatically in Cases 2, 3 and 4. The detailed results in Case 2
also forecast that the irrigation water for use in Iran and Turkmenistan reduces
by 34% (which means that it limits the irrigation lands) in comparison with
Case 1. Moreover, ecological water use is also predicted to be severely reduced by
the development of the dam in the upstream area, either in Afghanistan or in Iran-
Turkmenistan. The model demonstrates that the environmental ﬂow will decrease by
50% in Case 2.136
Figure 2 illustrates the variation in water storage of the Doosti Dam, with and with-
out the Salma Dam, over a 43-year period (the period for which data is available). The
water storage of the Doosti Dam is expected to be reduced to zero 15 times in 43 years
after the construction of the Salma Dam, while it would be only 5 times out of 43 years
in the case ‘without the Salma Dam’.137 All these negative effects on water quantity in
the downstream part of the basin as a result the construction of the Salma Dam may
cause severe secondary impacts, targeting human vital needs – namely, drinking
136 For more detailed information, see Nagheeby, n. 20 above.
137 Ibid.
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water, loss of livelihoods (particularly in the agricultural sector), displacing the local
downstream residents, and destroying the ecosystem.
5.    
     
As a starting point we mentioned that limited sovereignty gives Afghanistan the basic
right to utilize the shared watercourse and develop a dam on the Harirud River. At
the same time, Afghanistan is obliged to comply with its international obligations.
The legitimacy of the behaviour of Afghanistan can ﬁrstly be analyzed from the per-
spective of whether it has complied with its legal obligations under international
water law. Secondly, as legitimacy goes beyond merely assessing compliance with inter-
national water law, some other aspects, such as equity and the right to development,
will also have to be considered.
5.1. Afghanistan’s Utilization of the Harirud Water
The central question for discussion is whether the way in which Afghanistan exercised
its right can be considered as complying with its obligations under international law.
Neither of the riparian states to the Harirud River is a member of the UNWC.
However, the equitable and reasonable utilization principle forms part of customary
























1 (Natural) 51.59 1,018.63 3,137.42 0 4
2 (Both) 18.64 761.75 2,719.40 4 10
3 (Both + 25%) 13.98 492.30 1,532.90 4 15
4 (Both + 50%) 9.32 235.42 981.10 7 24
Figure 2 Water Storage of the Doosti Dam in the Case of ‘With SalmaDam’ and ‘Without SalmaDam’
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law and is therefore binding upon all states, including Afghanistan. The modelled sub-
stantial damage and negative impacts resulting from the building of the Salma Dam
show that the shared watercourse is not being utilized in a manner that can be consid-
ered equitable and reasonable. In order to utilize a shared watercourse in an equitable
and reasonable manner, all relevant factors as listed in Article 6 UNWC should be
analyzed diligently by taking into account the interests of other riparian states. By oper-
ating the Salma Dam, Afghanistan uses a substantially larger proportion of the water
resources – as is illustrated in Table 3 and Figure 2 – than what could be considered
an equitable and reasonable share according to the criteria provided in the UNWC.
By not assessing the interests of other riparian states and by not allocating to them
an equitable and reasonable share of the Harirud River, Afghanistan has not respected
the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.
5.2. The Construction of the Salma Dam under the No-Harm Principle
The construction of the SalmaDam has had a severe impact on downstream states. This
damage has occurred as a result of building a hydro-electric power installation with a
plan to expand the irrigation area on a shared river. Such an act could be conducted
only under the control or with the permission of the state of origin. Finally, the conse-
quences are suffered by the downstream countries. These consequences could be sum-
marized as negative impacts on securing water for vital human needs, on the
agricultural population (through involuntary displacement and resettlement), and
environmental degradation, particularly in the Karakum desert.
Therefore, given the signiﬁcant transboundary damage resulting from the construc-
tion of the dam, it seems that Afghanistan has not complied with the no-harm obliga-
tion either.
5.3. The Obligation of Afghanistan to Cooperate
In addition, Afghanistan did not respond to the messages or notiﬁcations from down-
stream countries to cooperate. It is submitted that the procedural obligations of shared
watercourse states require that, in order to comply with their substantive international
obligations, they should cooperate in an exchange of data and information to conduct
assessments and, if necessary, engage in consultation and negotiation. Indeed, anywater-
course state must cooperate with other co-riparian states in determining an equitable
allocation of water, taking into account the equitable and reasonable utilization prin-
ciple. This means that, in order to determine equitable and reasonable utilization, water-
course states may consider the establishment of joint mechanisms or notify the results of
their assessment to other potentially affected states to enable them also to evaluate such
utilization. In the event that the state of origin does not establish such a joint assessment
or does not notify other potentially affected states, it could be argued that this state has
failed to comply with its obligation to cooperate.138 In such circumstances, other water-
course states may argue that the utilization of the shared watercourse is inequitable and
138 See further the Pulp Mills case, n. 83 above.
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unreasonable. At a minimum, they can argue that an assessment, if any, was conducted
without adequate consideration of the interests of other affected watercourse states. As
mentioned above, one of the implications of the duty of notiﬁcation is the obligation to
conduct a (transboundary) EIA, which could have enabled consideration of the potential
impact of the project on other watercourse states. Afghanistan, as the state of origin, has
neither consulted with potentially affected states (Iran and Turkmenistan), nor shared
the results of any assessments it would have conducted. This obligation therefore
seems to have been violated by Afghanistan.
5.4. Equity and Other Considerations
It is one thing to establish that an upstream state (Afghanistan in this case) would have
violated obligations under international law as it uses the sharedwater in an inequitable
and unreasonable manner, and as it violates the no-harm principle and the duty to
cooperate. It is yet another to conclude that its behaviour in building the Salma Dam
is illegitimate overall, as this could require a broader analysis, such as equally including
human rights or equity considerations. It is not immediately clear to which results the
incorporation of those considerations would lead. A distinction should be made
between the upstream state’s compliance with its international obligations and its
right to build a dam on a shared watercourse.
The construction of the Salma Dam may have negative impacts on downstream
states. Such impacts may lead to a wide range of problems for downstream states,
including but not limited to a shortage of drinking water and environmentally adverse
impacts. Therefore, the construction of the Salma Dam will undoubtedly result in sub-
stantial damage to downstream states. Nonetheless, not all types of impact could be
considered to be compensable damage under international law. Furthermore, as an
upstream state, Afghanistan may invoke its right to water and justify its utilization of
the Harirud River. In sum, the negative impacts of the construction of the Salma
Dam are complex to measure, but the occurrence of such impacts is unavoidable.
Nevertheless, one may argue that the upstream state – which, in this scenario, has a
lower development index than the other riparian states and concurrently suffers from
severe poverty and lack of infrastructure, even for drinking water, as a result of a pro-
tracted civil war – will have the right of an equitable and reasonable utilization of the
shared river. No one can preclude such a sovereign state from utilizing its natural
resources in accordance with international law.
The technical story aspects of the construction of the Salma Dam reveal a dilemma
which arises with many dam-related projects. On the one hand, an upstream state has
the right to use its water resources for its economic development and for the beneﬁt of
its own citizens; on the other hand, the construction of the dam may lead to negative
impacts on the downstream states. The contribution of international law is, of course,
precisely to facilitate a reconciliation between these two competing interests. In legal
terms, this leads to the question of whether the negative impacts resulting from the
construction of the dam are such that one can no longer argue that there is a lawful util-
ization of the water resources by Afghanistan.
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As a country with the lowest development index, Afghanistan claims that a develop-
ment project such as the Salma Dam is necessary to overcome poverty. The country was
involved in several armed conﬂicts for years and, as a result, its infrastructure and irri-
gation systems, in particular, were either destroyed or not developed. Therefore, the
development of water resources for Afghans – such as the Salma Dam in the Harirud
River – is deﬁned as a key policy to alleviate the existing vulnerable socio-economic
conditions.139 However, the socio-economic needs of the downstream countries are
also highly dependent upon the shared waters of the Harirud River. Developing a
hydro-electric project in one of the least developed countries without considering the
interests of downstream countries may increase regional rivalries. This dichotomy
may lead to an approach discussed by McIntyre, which suggests that there should be
a proportionate distribution of beneﬁts in the use of a shared resource.140 This
maxim could be used to ensure a proportional balancing of the legitimate interests of
the Harirud watercourse states. To develop this approach, their current circumstances,
development level, economic capacity and needs should be taken into consideration.
In sum, the fact that Afghanistan is a least developed country may give it a stronger
claim to use the Harirud River as a development goal and to protect the right of its citi-
zens to drinking water. Yet, it is not clear to what extent these equitable and human
rights considerations would necessarily have to be considered more important than
the negative consequences to which the dam construction would lead in the down-
stream states. After all, its construction could also lead to violations of human rights
for downstream users – for example, in the case of forced displacement of local popula-
tions because of a changedwatercourse, or in the case of a violation of the right towater
in downstream states. In sum, equitable treatment and human rights considerations are
undoubtedly of importance, but do not necessarily lead to a clear-cut outcome when
assessing the legitimacy of dam construction.
5.5. Implications
From the above analysis it seems that, given the negative consequences of the construc-
tion of the dam on the downstream users, Afghanistanmay have violated its substantive
obligations under international law. More particularly, the principle of equitable use
and the no-harm principle may have been breached. Perhaps of more importance
(and less debatable) is the fact that Afghanistan has violated the obligation to cooperate
and the duty of notiﬁcation. The entire ethos of the international water regime is pre-
cisely to create a culture of communication among co-riparian states, which could
have been possible if the duty of notiﬁcation had been respected. Evidently, the most
important policy implication is not that a violation of its obligations would result in
Afghanistan no longer being able to make use of the dam. After all, the essence of
the equitable and reasonable utilization principle is precisely that riparian states need
to agree on the amount of the particular water source that each could use. The most
139 O. Joya, Natural Resources: What Strategy for Afghanistan? (Samuel Hall, 2012).
140 See McIntyre, n. 97 above.
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important conclusion, therefore, is that what should happen now is what should have
happened earlier: negotiations leading to, preferably, a joint management of the entire
river basin and, potentially, an adjustment to the share of water used in order to reach
an equitable and reasonable utilization of the water. In this respect, the role of inter-
national organizations like the ADB, the World Bank, and outside-basin states like
India is important and must comply with international law.
6. 
The goal of this contribution was to explore how the concept of legitimacy within the
context of international water law can be applied to the speciﬁc case of building the
Salma Dam. In using the Harirud River basin as the setting, this article focuses on
the UNWC, which establishes normative standards that enable an assessment of the
legitimacy of dam construction in an international water course.
We have argued that building the Salma Dam in Afghanistan may have dramatic
impacts on the downstream states, Iran and Turkmenistan. Such an impact would
not be limited to environmental damage, but may also lead to large-scale displacement
of local communities, who need drinking water, and to the destruction of their liveli-
hood. This may result in environmental damage and economic loss, as well as a disre-
gard for human rights to adequate food, water, and shelter. Such damage could be
limited through an equitable and reasonable utilization of the shared watercourse in
question. In that case, all watercourse states, including upstream and downstream
states, will have the right to utilize the shared watercourse. Nevertheless, such utiliza-
tion must comply with international law. Although various theories have been intro-
duced in international law in relation to the management and utilization of a shared
watercourse, the equitable and reasonable utilization principle is widely accepted as
a customary rule of international law and therefore is binding upon all states. As a
result, the watercourse states have a customary legal obligation to utilize the shared
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner and not to cause signiﬁcant trans-
boundary damage to other watercourse states. These obligations are accompanied by
the procedural obligation to cooperate and to conduct a transboundary EIA of projects
before permitting them.
In the particular case of the Salma Dam, Afghanistan as state of origin has failed to
comply with its international obligations regarding the adequate assessment of the
impacts of the project and the exchange of information concerning the development
of the dam. Furthermore, our analysis has shown that operating the Salma Dam at
full capacity will cause signiﬁcant transboundary damage to downstream states.
Therefore, we conclude that in building the Salma Dam on the Harirud River, the
state of origin failed to comply with its international obligations. We used the broader
notion of legitimacy to assess the construction of the dam, arguing that obligations
other than those resulting from international water law (such as environmental law
and human rights), as well as equity considerations, would also have to be incorporated
in the assessment. However, applying those considerations in practice does not lead to
clear-cut results.
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Themost important conclusion is that the concept of equitable and reasonable water
use also enables parties in principle to search for constructive options, leading to an
optimal utilization of the shared water resource. Given Afghanistan’s non-compliance
with its duty of notiﬁcation, it has been impossible to establish a culture of open com-
munication between the three co-riparian states to date. It is hoped that clarifying the
obligations under international water law and assessing the broader legitimacy of the
construction of the dam may enable the riparian states to institutionalize mutual
cooperation and create a functional mechanism of beneﬁt sharing for the entire river
basin, thus respecting the interests of all co-riparian states involved.
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